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Non-technical summary
Participative establishment practices are praised as suitable and effective
means to increase the competitiveness of establishments. In Germany, two
approaches to more participation of non-managers at establishment decisions
and the work process have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there are
changes towards more more participation in the work organization that are
usually induced by the management such as team-work, a reduction of
hierarchies, or autonomous work groups. On the other hand, there are works
councils, a long established participation instrument, which is initiated by the
employees. The interaction effect between the productivity impact of
management-led employee participation and the presence of works councils is
a priori unclear. Work councils might facilitate an efficient implementation of
participative work forms by using their collective voice function to mediate
between the diverging interests of the management and the employees. On the
other hand, they might initiate restrictions on the measures taken in order to
reduce the additional burden imposed on the employees after the introduction
of a more participative work organization.
The empirical evidence concerning the productivity effects of management-led
participative measures is mixed. The most important reason for the disturbing
divergence in the results seem to be estimation problems. The literature
mentions two main sources of estimation biases in this context: selectivity of
organizational forms caused by temporary shocks (endogeneity) and
unobserved structural differences between establishments (unobserved time
invariant heterogeneity). The literature on the empirical productivity effects of
works councils is limited in number and inconclusive. Studies on the
interaction effects between works councils and the productivity impact of
participative work organizations are virtually absent.
Therefore this paper measures the productivity impact of management-led
participative establishment practices. On the basis of the IAB establishment
panel – a representative German establishment data set comprising
establishments from all sectors of the economy – the following result is
obtained: the presence of team work and autonomous work groups, and a
reduction of hierarchies in 1997, increases the average establishment
productivity significantly in the period 1997-2000. The estimation strategy
controls unobserved time invariant establishment heterogeneity by using a
two-step estimation procedure. First, a standard Cobb-Douglas production
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function including the variable input factors labour and capital is estimated by
a system GMM panel esimation. From this regression, the establishment
specific time-invariant component of the residual (or the fixed effect) is
calculated. Second, the fixed effect is explained by establishment
characteristics including the presence of works councils, participative work
organization, and employee characteristics. These time-invariant
characteristics would drop out if they would be included in the first estimation
step and therefore the two-step procedure has to be chosen in order to measure
their impact on establishment productivity.
In addition, the estimation strategy also controls for endogeneity of
participative work forms by instrument variable regressions. Instead of taking
the lagged values of the variables, additional external variables are used: those
depict expected qualification problems and expected increases in training
efforts to identify the decision of the establishment to introduce a participative
work organization. After controlling for the endogeneity of the implementation
of participative work forms, the measured productivity impact increases
considerably. This means that German establishments mainly introduce
participation in bad times and that the instrument equation reduces the
measurement error of the participation variable.
Finally, it is shown that the productivity effect of management-led
participation can only be measured in establishments with work councils. An
endogeneous switching regression model estimates the impact of the time
invariant establishment and employee characteristics on the fixed effects
separately for establishments with and without works councils. The
endogeneity of the presence of works councils is taken into account by adding
the estimated establishment specific probability to have a works council. This
probability is derived from a probit estimation explaining the decisions of the
employees to implement a works council.
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Abstract
This paper measures the productivity impact of management-led participative establishment
practices. On the basis of a representative German establishment data set, the IAB
establishment panel, the study finds that the presence of team-work, a reduction of
hierarchies and autonomous work groups in 1997 significantly increases average
establishment productivity in 1997 – 2000. An endogeneous switching regression model
takes the endogeneity of work councils into account and shows that the productivity effect
can only be measured in establishments with works councils, i.e. employee induced
participation. The estimation strategy controls for unobserved time invariant establishment
heterogeneity by using a two-step system GMM panel regression approach. It
simultaneously controls for endogeneity of participative work organization by using
instrument variable regressions.
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 Introduction
Participative establishment practices are praised as suitable and effective
means to increase the competitiveness of firms (Ichniowski, Shaw and
Prennushi, 1997; Godard and Delaney, 2000; Black and Lynch, 2001; Wolf
and Zwick, 2003). Several empirical papers measure positive productivity
effects if Fordistic production methods are replaced by work organizations that
increase the involvement of non-managers such as team-work, flat hierarchies
or autonomous work groups (Greenan and Mairesse, 2002). In Germany, in
addition to these forms of worker participation, works councils are an
established and elaborate alternative system of employee participation (Rogers
and Streeck, 1995). In contrast to team-work, flatter hierarchies, etc., that are
usually introduced by the management, the initiative for the introduction of a
works council comes from the employees. Works councils build trustful
industrial relations and improve the flow of information between employees
and management (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; FitzRoy and Kraft, 2000;
Addison, Schnabel and Wagner, 2001), they foster trust and co-operation
(Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003) and give employees a far-reaching voice in
decisions. Although there is a broad literature on works councils in Germany,
there is only very limited and inconclusive empirical evidence for the
productivity effects of works councils (Sadowski, Backes-Gellner, and Frick,
1995; Frick and Sadowski, 1995; Addison, Schnabel and Wagner, 2001;
Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003).
It is completely unclear so far, if the presence of a works council in an
enterprise hampers the effects of management-led employee participation or
improves them. In the theoretical literature, arguments for positive and for
negative spill-over effects can be found. On the one hand, works councils may
facilitate the introduction of new work practices by assuring the work-force
that the negative consequences will be cushioned and controlled. In addition,
they may give the management crucial information on the efficient
implementation of new work organizations. On the other hand, works councils
may restrict the management in the way participatory work places should be
introduced in order to protect the work force. Especially necessary reductions
in the workforce or changes in the qualificatory mixture of the workforce are
mentioned here. A consequence may be that the full productivity effect of
management-led participatory work organization is not obtained. To my
knowledge, only Frick (2002) and Hübler and Jirjahn (2002) studied the
interaction between works councils and participatory work organizations so
far. Frick (2002) finds that the higher the number of participatory work
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organizations, the less co-operative are work councils. Hübler and Jirjahn
(2002) derive a negative interaction effect between works councils and the
labour productivity effect from a reduction of hierarchies, while they find a
positive interaction effect from team-work and groups with own financial
responsibilities. Their cross-section analysis encounters causality problems,
however. In addition, their endogeneous variable is turn-over divided by the
number of employees. Therefore it seems problematic to include sectors such
as the public sector, insurances and banks whose turn-over is misleading
(Schnabel, 2002). The obvious gap in the literatur is an important motivation
to analyse empirically if employee-induced participation and management-led
participation hamper or support each other with respect to establishment
productivity.
It is not easy to detect empirically if organizational changes increase firm
productivity, because firms may tend to introduce innovations depending on
their economic situation. The OECD points to this problem as follows: “If
firms only began to experiment with new forms of working practices when
they faced dire trouble, the existence of practices might be associated with
poorer performance, at least over the short-term. On the other hand, if flexible
practices were introduced mainly into firms with more highly skilled
workforces, there is the danger that higher performance may be attributed to
the working practices rather than the higher skills” (OECD, 1999, p. 182). This
contribution shows that indeed both factors, selectivity of organizational forms
caused by temporary shocks (endogeneity) and unobserved structural
differences (unobserved time invariant heterogeneity), have an impact on the
estimated productivity effects of participation. In addition, the productivity
effects of re-organizations that increase the participation of employees are
assessed with lags up to three years. This is important, because the literature
shows that the effects of work organization measures are clearly smaller
during than after their implementation (Kato and Morishima, 2002).
Also the productivity impact of works councils is not easy to capture, because
it difficult to establish a unilateral causal link between productivity and the
presence of works councils. The introduction of works councils is
endogeneous, and there are systematic and probably unobserved differences
between enterprises with and without works councils (Frick and Sadowski,
1995; Addison, Schnabel and Wagner, 1997; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2002). For
that reason, this paper takes into account the endogeneity of works councils in
an endogeneous switching regression model and it also shows that the
production functions differ between establishments with and without works
councils.
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The remainder of this contribution is structured as follows: in the next section,
the theoretical impact of participative work forms and works councils on
establishment performance is surveyed. In section three, the German data set
(the IAB establishment panel) is presented. Then follows a description of the
incidence of re-organizations and their correlation with works councils in
Germany. The fifth section presents the empirical estimation strategy and the
estimation results. The last section concludes.
Background discussion
The main principle behind management-led initiatives to improve worker
participation is to get lower level staff more involved in the decision and work
process and to grant them greater autonomy and control over job tasks and
methods of work (Cappelli and Rogovsky, 1994). This increases the necessity
of horizontal communication between front-line employees (Ichniowksi, Shaw
and Prennushi, 1997). Both, intensified communication and autonomy of non-
managerial staff is supposed to be improved if the work organization is
characterized by (autonomous) teams and flat hierarchies (Appelbaum et al.,
2000). But how may an increased employee involvement raise firm
productivity? Firstly, this strategy takes advantage of the specific knowledge
non-managerial employees have about their own work processes and combines
the skills of a group of workers (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Cooke, 1994;
Hübler and Jirjahn, 2002). Therefore higher participation increases the
expertise used. Secondly, individuals are expected to have a higher
identification with their enterprise and the decisions taken, feel more
committed and consequently do a better job (Huselid, 1995; Fernie and
Metcalf, 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; Godard and Delaney,
2000). Thirdly, employee participation at decisions can balance production
more effectively to eliminate bottle-necks or interruptions of the production
process (Appelbaum et al., 2000). Fourthly, reducing hierarchies may make
some employees of the middle management redundant, and a higher cost
autonomy of groups may diminish waste, inventories, and inefficiencies
(Appelbaum et al., 2000).
Other observers argue, however, that organizational changes that are supposed
to improve employees´ participation may also increase stress and responsibility
and lead to work intensification (Ramsey, Scholarios and Harley, 2000). A
change of tasks, responsibilities and work structures renders skills obsolete,
increases work pressure and may deteriorate the position of some employees
(Greenan and Mairesse, 2002). Some employees might attach little value to
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participation (Cooke, 1994). In addition, organizational changes always induce
adoption costs that have to be taken on before the pay-off can be observed
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). If, for example, the returns to re-organizations
are small or highly uncertain for the employees and in particular if the
organizational change endangers their jobs, employees will hamper these
changes (Zwick, 2002b). Finally, it seems plausible that the success of
organizational changes depends upon a couple of internal and external
conditions. Some authors argue, for instance, that productivity gains of higher
participation might not occur universally but rely on certain business strategies
and production practices (Ichniowski et al., 1996; Youndt et al., 1996; OECD,
1999). For the United States, Cooke (1994) finds for example that teams
contribute more to value added in unionised firms than in non-union firms.
Addison et al. (2000) find positive effects of employee involvement on
productivity only in non-union plants in Britain.
Even if only studies covering several sectors are taken, the empirical evidence
on the productivity effects of participation is mixed. On the one hand, Arnal,
Ok and Torres (2001: 28) reckon that “a review of available studies suggests
that there is a positive relationship between new work practices and
establishment level performance” (Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw and
Prennushi, 1997; Black and Lynch, 2001; Wolf and Zwick, 2003; Bauer,
2003). On the other hand, there are several studies that did not find any
significant effects of participation on establishment productivity (see the
surveys in Godard and Delaney, 2000 or Cappelli and Neumark, 2001).
Also the presence of works councils might influence the productivity effects of
management-induced participative work organizations. The German Works
Constitution Act (WCA) determines that councils can be elected by the work
force of establishments with five of more employees. Their creation depends
on the initiative of the establishment´s employees, however, and therefore
councils are by far not present in all eligible establishments. Variation between
establishments concerning the implementation of works councils is important,
because it allows an empirical assessment of the productivity impact of works
councils. While works councils have full co-determination rights on payment
methods, leave arrangements, overtime work, and the use of technical devices
designed to monitor employee performance, they only have consultation rights
on changes in equipment and working methods (Müller-Jentsch, 1995;
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Addison, Schnabel and Wagner, 2001; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003).1 This leaves
a role for unilateral management decisions on the introduction of more
participative work forms also in establishments with a works council. We may
therefore observe both, co-determined enterprises that have more participative
work forms and those that do not have them.
The role of works councils in increasing the joint establishment surplus is
comparable to that of management-led participative work forms. They exert a
collective voice (Freeman and Medoff, 1979; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987; Frick
and Sadowski, 1995) and communicate worker preferences and implicit
knowledge, which helps to optimise the work routine and to moderate worker
demands during rough times (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Addison, Schnabel
and Wagner, 2001; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2002). The interactions between
management-led participation and works councils regarding establishment
productivity are less clear, however. On the one hand, works councils may use
their bargaining power to negotiate less productive work practices that require
less additional effort or endanger less jobs if the management decides to
introduce productivity-enhancing work practices (Frick, 2002). It is therefore
possible that works councils weaken the full productivity effects of more
participative work forms in order to reduce the negative impact on the
employees (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003). In addition, works councils may be
inclined to make increased participation voluntary, defending the choice of
employees not to participate. This would give works councils the opportunity
to hold participation activities “hostage” until certain works council demands
are met (Cooke, 1994). On the other hand, works councils and worker
participation by work organization may be complements because the latter
mainly concerns the better usage of information on individual workplaces and
teams, whereas questions for the entire establishment can be better arranged by
works councils (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003). Works councils also demand a
credible commitment of the management to take into account the workers´
interests and to build trust that the information given by the management is
correct. As a result, a serious hearing is given to employees´ ideas and
concerns about the design and the processes of participation (Cooke, 1994;
Freeman and Lazear, 1995). This increases the workers´ co-operation with the
introduction and implementation of more participative work forms (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992; Wolf and Zwick, 2002b; Zwick, 2002b). In addition, flatter
hierarchies and team work increase the cohesion among the employees. High
                                                     
1 Just the amendment of the WCA in August 2001 includes co-determination rights of works
councils on the organization of team work (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2002).
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cohesion is a prerequisite for an effective collective voice, however (Levine,
1990; Kato and Morishima, 2002). Hübler and Jirjahn (2002) and Frick (2002)
note that the productivity effects of re-organization measures depend on the
level of trust and co-operation between works councils and the management.
Cooke (1994) sees the interaction effects between works councils and
management-led participation between the two poles positive collective voice
effects and negative works council restriction effects.
It was already mentioned in the introduction that empirical research on the
interaction effects between management-led participation and works councils
is virtually absent. Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (1997) mention that works
councils are less likely to be observed in firms in which other forms of direct
participation are practiced. They argue that the two forms of participation
could be an alternative to each other, whereas Müller-Jentsch (1995) stresses
that works councils initially rejected new management-led forms of employee
involvement. On the basis of the Survey of Employee Direct Participation in
Organisational Change (EPOC) data, Arnal, Ok and Torres (2001) find,
however, that several management-induced participatory work practices are
positively correlated with the incidence of works councils. Frick (2002) argues
that more management-led participative work forms are found in
establishments with works councils, but that these works councils tend to be
less co-operative or even hostile. Several authors analyse the establishment
characteristics that promote the beneficial effects of works councils on
productivity. Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) stress that positive productivity effects
of works councils can only be found in firms additionally covered by collective
bargaining agreements. Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001) explain that
works councils only induce a positive productivity effect in larger
establishments with more than 100 employees.2 Quite the contrary, Smith
(1994) finds stronger productivity effects of works councils in smaller
establishments. Finally FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) show that works councils
reduce productivity if the firm does not implement employee profit sharing.
Also for management-led participation, some papers relate the productivity
effects to specific industrial relations.
                                                     
2 The authors admit, however that their results may be biased because the presence of works
councils is assumed to be exogeneous in their regressions.
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The Data
In order to assess the productivity impact of participative work organizations
and their interactions with works councils for the average firm in an economy,
we need representative establishment panel data covering several sectors
(Black and Lynch, 2001). A panel structure is needed, because cross section
data on productivity and the introduction of measures do not allow a
distinction between cause and effect (OECD, 1999; Wolf and Zwick, 2002b).
Data from several sectors are necessary, because the productivity effects of
one sector can not easily be transferred to those of other sectors (Godard and
Delaney, 2000). In order to avoid omitted variable bias, a broad range of
establishment and employee characteristics should be included besides
information on participation (Zwick, 2002a).
The establishments asked in the IAB establishment panel enquête are selected
from the parent sample of all German establishments that employ at least one
employee covered by social security.3 Thus, self-employed and establishments
that employ only people not covered by social security (mineworkers, farmers,
artists, journalists, etc.) as well as public employers with solely civil servants
do not belong to the original sample. In addition in order to avoid unnecessary
establishment heterogeneity, the agricultural sector and the banking and credit
sector are excluded (Bauer, 2003). Only establishments with more than five
employees are included, because smaller establishments are not eligible for
installing a works council. The establishments covered by the survey are asked
every year about the presence of a works council, coverage by collective
bargaining, turnover, number of employees, personnel problems,
apprenticeship training, investments, information and communication
technology (ICT) usage, innovations, and public subsidies. From time to time,
additional topics, such as training and work organization are added to the
questionnaire.
Capital is constructed using the standard perpetual inventory method (Black
and Lynch, 2001; Hempell, 2002). The book value of the capital stock is
calculated for 1997 (or the first year an establishment is observed after 1997)
by dividing replacement investments by the sum of the (assumed) average
depreciation rate and average growth rate of investments. From the capital
                                                     
3 A detailled description of this data set can be found in Kölling (2000).
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stock in the basis year, the capital stock in each following year is calculated by
adding deflated expansion investments from the previous period.4
For the purpose of this analysis, only profit oriented establishments and
establishments that have not been bought by other establishments or bought
other establishments are included.5 The variables describing the management-
led participative work organizations (the introduction of team-work or
autonomous work groups or the reduction of hierarchies) refer to the years
1996 and 1997. After combining this information with additional information
from earlier waves that indicate if a re-organization has been introduced
already before 1996, the variables show if the management-led participative
measures have been ever introduced in the establishment until 1997. The
impact of these measures on productivity is estimated in a panel estimation
including average productivity of the establishments in the years 1997 – 2000.
The incidence of participative work forms in Germany
The theoretical considerations above indicate that there are many reasons for
the supposition that German firms can yield a higher productivity level if they
use participative organizational measures such as team-work, flat hierarchies
and work groups with own financial responsibilities. The main diagonals of
Table 1 provide an overview of the number of establishments that introduced
participative workforms until 1997 in our representative sample for Germany
for establishments with works councils and for establishments without works
councils separately. The most common re-organization measure in 1997 is
with 28.7% of the establishments with works councils the delegation of
responsibility and decisions to lower levels of hierarchy. Almost 12% of the
establishments without works councils introduced this measure. Team-work
has been introduced by 19.4% (6.5%), and work groups with independent
budget have been introduced by more than 13% (almost 5%) of the
establishments. All measures have been introduced clearly more frequently by
                                                     
4 The average depreciation rate is assumed to equal ten percent, while the average growth
rate of investments is assumed to equal five percent (compare also Hempell, 2002). Changes
in these assumptions did not influence the results from the productivity estimations.
5 We sort the establishments into the following sectors: mining and basic materials, food,
consumer goods, production goods, investment goods, construction, trade, traffic and
communication, hotels and restaurants, education, health and social affairs, electronic data
processing and research and development as well as business consulting, other business
services, and other personal services.
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those establishments with works councils. This result is in line with Arnal, Ok
and Torres (2001), Frick (2002) and  Hübler and Jirjahn (2002).6
Table 1: Introduction of participative work forms until 1997 (in%)
Establishments with
works council
Establishments without
works council
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 shift responsibility to lower level
of hierarchy
28.7
(100)
11.7
(100)
2 team-work and self-responsible
teams
11.8
(60.8)
19.4
(100)
4.1
(62,5)
6.4
(100)
3 work groups with independent
budget
7.7
(58.7)
5.3
(40.6)
13.2
(100)
2.5
(53.4)
1.6
(33.5)
4.7
(100)
Notes: The figures present the percentage of establishments applying a certain measure
(based on the whole population). The figures in brackets describe the percentage of
establishments that use a certain combination of measures (based on the number of
establishments in the corresponding category).
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 and 1998, own calculations.
The figures in the lower triangle of Table 1 describe the incidence of different
combinations of the measures. That is, for example 11.8% of the
establishments with works councils aimed at improving the participation of
their employees by shifting responsibility to lower levels of hierarchy and by
implementing team-work and self-responsible teams. When we only take the
group of establishments with works councils that introduce work groups with
independent budgets (i.e. set it as 100%) then more than 60% of these
establishments introduce both measures. Team-work and self-responsible
teams have been introduced by more than 40% (more than 33%) of those
establishments that have work groups with independent budgets. Among the
firms that implemented team-work and self-responsible teams, a shift of
responsibility to a lower level of hierarchy is also very widespread. These
findings indicate that many German establishments introduced more than one
management-induced participative measure until 1997.
                                                     
6 One has to take into account, however, that the establishments with and without work
councils differ with respect to establishment size and other characteristics. The multivariate
analyses in the next section control for that.
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Empirical Analysis of the Productivity Effects of
Participation
The productivity effects of a participative work organization are determined by
estimating Cobb-Douglas production functions (see also Black and Lynch,
2001). The dependent variable denotes the economic value added (turn over
minus external input costs), and the explanatory variables include capital, the
number of employees, participative work forms, works councils as well as
other control variables. The strong coherence among the dummy-variables
indicating if an establishment introduced participative measures until 1997
(see table 1) is accounted for by aggregating the observed three measures to
one independent “participation” variable which equals one if at least one of the
measures has been introduced (compare also Hübler and Jirjahn, 2002).7
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Cross-section production function estimations may be biased, because some
explanatory variables, especially capital and labour, are endogenous (Griliches
and Mairesse, 1998). Important reasons for the endogeneity of labour, capital,
and other variables in the production function may be that unobserved time
invariant factors, such as management quality, industrial relations, or
technological change, have an impact on the explanatory variables and on the
value added. If unobserved characteristics of the establishment, such as
management quality or industrial relations, are correlated with both,
participation and productivity, cross-section estimates are inconsistent. A
possibility to correct the estimation bias is to use panel estimation methods that
eliminate the unobserved time invariant heterogeneity. If, for example,
deviations from an establishment’s mean or first differences are taken, all time
invariant variables, such as the introduction or presence of certain work
organizations during a period of time, the industry sector, the existence of
works councils as well as other variables in the production function, can not be
identified, however, because they drop out (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi,
1997; Black and Lynch, 2001). This feature proves to be a crucial hindrance in
our case, because we only know if an establishment has ever introduced
management-led participation until 1997 or not. Therefore, the exact
                                                     
7 The estimations have also been performed on the basis of one independent “participation”
factor derived by a main component factor analysis from the three measures (see also Wolf
and Zwick, 2002b). All results are qualitatively the same and therefore not reported here.
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implementation date is unknown, and there are not yearly data on the incidence
of these measures.
In order to obtain information on the productivity impact of rather time
invariant establishment characteristics such as a participative work
organization and nevertheless control unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity,
the two step estimation procedure suggested by Black and Lynch (2001) is
adopted. The basic idea of the estimation strategy is to calculate the
establishment-specific time invariant component of the residual (or in other
words the fixed effect indicating if an establishment´s total factor productivity
is structurally higher or lower than that of its competitors) from a panel
production function estimation containing the variable input factors capital and
labour. In the second step, the fixed effects are explained by the quasi time
invariant establishment and employee characteristics including participation
and works councils.
In the first step estimation, the system GMM (GMM-SYS) estimator, proposed
by Arellano and Bover (1995), is used instead of a simple within estimator or a
simple GMM estimator. The GMM-SYS estimator avoids the poor finite
sample properties of the simple within estimator or the simple GMM
estimator, which take first differences to eliminate unobserved firm-specific
effects or use lagged internal instruments to correct for simultaneity in the
first-differenced equations. Both estimators produce implausibly low capital
coefficients and returns to scale, because measurement errors in the
explanatory variables (especially capital) bias the coefficients towards zero. In
addition, the lagged levels of capital (or replacement investments) or labour
are usually only weakly correlated with the subsequent first differences of
these variables and therefore have a weak explanatory power (Griliches and
Mairesse, 1998; Blundell and Bond, 1999). Therefore, in the GMM-SYS
estimator the lagged first-differences are used as instruments for the current
input values in levels in addition to the usual lagged levels as instruments for
equations in first-differences. It hereby has to be assumed that the internal
instruments are correlated with current values but independent of the error
term. This GMM-SYS estimator avoids inconsistencies incurred by
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity of the choice of capital, labour, and
output (Blundell and Bond, 1999; Black and Lynch, 2001; Hempell, 2002).
The first step of the panel regression can therefore be written as follows:
(1) ln ln ln with 1997 2000,t t t tY K L t= + + + = −α β υ ε
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where Y is value added, K is capital, L is the number of employees, υ is the
unobserved time invariant establishment-specific fixed effect, the parameters α
and β are the regression coefficients to be estimated, and εt is the normally
distributed idiosyncratic error term with expected value zero and variance 2σ .
Also year and industry dummies are included to allow for differential industry
productivity effects and to control for business cycle effects. The estimation
results of equation (1) can be found in table A3 in the appendix.8  Striking is
the low coefficient of capital.9 If there are measurement errors for the input
factors (especially for capital), also the GMM-SYS estimator will be
inconsistent and we may observe too low capital intensities in the production
function (Griliches and Mairesse, 1998). Another reason might be the
relatively small amount of firms observed in at least three consecutive waves.
The GMM-SYS estimator depends on the absence of second order serial
correlation in the error term (Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2000), while a
negative first order correlation is consistent with the model assumptions.
Therefore, the serial correlation tests are reported. The Sargan-test indicates
that the model is not overidentified.
On the basis of these first step regression results, the establishment-specific
time invariant component of the residual υ in the period 1997 – 2000 is
calculated. It serves as dependent variable for the second estimation step
including the quasi time invariant establishment and employee characteristics.
From the results of the empirical literature it can be expected that a high share
of qualified employees and modern technical equipment increase the
productivity of the establishment (Addison et al., 2000; Black and Lynch,
2001; Wolf and Zwick, 2002b). In addition, exporters and establishments with
works councils and collective bargaining usually exhibit a significantly higher
productivity (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2002; Addison et al., 2000; Zwick, 2002b).
East German establishments may still have lower productivity while
differences between the business sectors are captured by 13 dummy variables.
Also four dummy variables for different legal establishment forms are
included in order to control for systematic differences between full and limited
liable establishments (Harhoff and Stahl, 1998). A definition of all variables as
well as their average values can be found in Table A1 in the appendix.
                                                     
8 The first step panel regressions were computed by using the two-step estimation procedure
in the DPD98 programme developed by Arellano and Bond (1998) running in GAUSS.
9 A simple fixed effects estimation in the first step leads to comparable labour and capital
coefficients. Therefore also the second step results are qualitatively the same (not shown
here).
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Participative measures and most other establishment characteristics may not
have an instantaneous effect on establishment productivity, and therefore the
productivity impact is lagged by using the 1997 values of  the explanatory
variables (Wolf and Zwick, 2002b; Zwick, 2002b; Kato and Morishima, 2002;
Bauer, 2003). In addition, by lagging the participative work forms and the
other explanatory variables, the endogeneity of these measures in the
productivity regression is mitigated (Caroli and Van Reenen, 1999). The
second step regression can therefore be written as:
(2) ,P X= + +υ θ δ ε
where P is the dummy “participation” and X represents the vector of the other
control variables including works councils. The parameters θ and δ are the
regression coefficients to be estimated, and ε is the normally distributed error
term with expected value zero and variance 2σ . The estimation results are
shown in table 2. Participation introduced until 1997 has no impact on average
establishment productivity in 1997 – 2000 while the other explanatory
variables have the expected signs.
Endogeneity of Participation
The panel regression in the last section can give only a first indication of
possible productivity effects of management-led measures that increase the
participation of employees, because the endogeneity of a participative work
organization is not taken into account. In a next step, it is therefore explored
on the basis of instrument variable regressions if the results presented in the
previous estimations are biased, because those establishments that decided to
introduce participative work forms until 1997 differ also with respect to other
characteristics that have an impact on productivity in the years after.
Most data sets do not provide suitable additional variables that meet the
requirements for qualifying them as identifying variables in an instrument
regression. In the case of panel data, lagged values or differences of the
explaining variable in question are often used as instruments. This strategy is
problematic, however, because the instruments are often only weakly
correlated with the endogenous variables, and explanatory variables are only
weakly correlated over time. Therefore, it is preferable to use external
instruments that intuitively explain the selection process in the establishment
and exhibit the necessary statistical properties (Griliches and Mairesse,
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1998).10 The wave 1997 of the IAB establishment panel contains information
on expected training activities and on expected personnel problems, which
may serve as identifying regressors for the decision to implement a
participative work organization. Seven suitable external instruments can be
found: three variables on expected personnel problems concerning skill gaps
and organizational changes11 and four training forms, the incidence of which is
expected to increase in the next two years.12 Each of these variables should be
positively correlated with the presence of participative work place practices,
because we can expect that establishments with a participative work
organization have a higher qualification demand and larger problems with
employee turn-over (Black and Lynch, 2001; Wolf and Zwick, 2002b). In
addition, the identifying variables are uncorrelated with establishment
productivity in the following years and therefore satisfy the statistical
requirements.
The instrument equation for the dummy “participative work organization” P
can be described as follows:
1 1 7 7(3) ... ,P I I X= + + + +κ κ η ε
where I1 – I7 are the identifying variables and X is the vector of control
variables from equation (2), while 1κ  - 7κ and η are the regression coefficients
to be estimated. Equation (3) is estimated simultaneously with the fixed effects
equation (2) using a full information treatment effects model. This implies that
the endogenous dummy P that is correlated with the error term in equation (2)
is replaced by the instrumented variable estimated in equation (3), P . This
variable is correlated with the original dummy but independent from ε in
equation (2) and therefore exogeneous. All instruments have the expected
significantly positive impact on the probability of the establishment to
                                                     
10 Nevertheless the list of external identifying variables used has an impact on the estimated
coefficient of the instrumented variable. Therefore, several different identifying variables
are used here.
11 The dummy variable has the value one if the establishment expects problems to find
suitable skilled employees on the labour market, organizational problems due to maternal
leave and a large demand for training and qualification. It is based on the question “Which
personnel problems do you expect in the following two years?”.
12 The four training forms are formal external courses, job rotation, self-induced training and
quality circles. The dummy variable has the value one if the establishment expects that the
incidence of these training forms increases during the next two years.
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introduce participation while also the controls from vector X have the expected
signs: larger establishments and establishments with investments in ICT and a
high share of qualified employees introduce participative work forms more
frequently while exporting establishments are less prone to implement
participation. The estimation results are not shown here.
Table 2: Productivity Effects of Participation on Average Productivity
1997-2000
OLS regression Treatment effects model
Coefficients z-values Coefficients z-values
Participation 0.03 0.82 0.26*** 2.38
ICT investment 0.11*** 2.72 0.10*** 2.65
Training 0.17*** 3.80 0.15*** 3.34
Share qualified employees 0.49*** 6.06 0.49*** 6.05
Exporter 0.20*** 3.85 0.20*** 3.77
State-of-the-art technical equipment 0.16*** 4.16 0.16*** 4.22
Works council 0.42*** 8.54 0.42*** 8.50
Collective bargaining 0.13*** 3.01 0.13*** 3.00
Individual establishment -0.37*** -6.54 -0.36*** -6.58
Partnership -0.09 -1.52 -0.09 -1.55
Publicly listed establishment 0.16** 2.16 0.16** 2.15
Establishment size 20-199 0.45*** 8.96 0.45*** 8.97
Establishment size 200-499 1.07*** 14.43 1.05*** 14.33
Establishment size 500-999 1.31*** 13.36 1.28*** 13.09
Establishment size 1000+ 1.82*** 18.61 1.78*** 18.12
East German establishment -0.35*** -9.01 -0.35*** -8.92
Constant -1.19*** -8.35 -1.65*** -6.51
N=2124 N=2124
R2=0.79
Notes: Significance levels: ***<1%, **<5%, all explanatory variables are in values for
1997, except works councils, the value of which is only available for 1998. Also 13 sector
dummy variables are included, standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 1999 and 2000, own calculations.
Controlling endogeneity of participation clearly increases the measured
productivity impact of the participation dummy on the average fixed effect
(see table 2). This result is also found by Wolf and Zwick (2002b), Hübler and
Jirjahn (2002) and Bauer (2003). The coefficients of the other explanatory
variables are more or less unchanged. This result shows that taking account of
selection effects can be decisive for the evaluation of the productivity effects
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of participation even after controlling unobserved heterogeneity. There are two
potential explanations for the increase in the measured productivity impact of
participation: On the one hand, especially establishments with a productivity
gap might introduce participation methods in order to improve their
competitiveness. This is also found by Nickell, Nicolitsas and Patterson
(2001). On the other hand, the instrumental variable regression reduces the
measurement error and hereby the downward bias incurred by it (Griliches and
Hausman, 1986; Zwick, 2003). Especially the dummy variable for
participation entails a large measurement error, because it values the
introduction of minor changes equivalently to a sweeping organizational
shake-up.
Presence of works councils
The production functions differ between establishments that have a works
council and those that do not have one – this is shown by a χ2 test.13 Therefore
the productivity effects of  management-led participation have to be estimated
separately for establishments with and without works councils and the
interaction effects between works councils and management-led participation
cannot be captured by just adding interaction terms (Frick and Sadowski,
1995). In addition, endogeneity of the presence of works councils has to be
taken into account, because it is not the average establishment that has a works
council. Therefore an endogeneous switching regression model should be
estimated instead of an exogeneous switching regression model (Hübler and
Jirjahn, 2002; Wolf and Zwick, 2002a).
In the first estimation step, the presence of a works council is estimated. It is
assumed that a latent variable W* indicates the benefits the employees have
from the installation of a work council:
 (4) * ,W Z= +γ ε
where Z is the vector of variables relevant for the benefits of the works council
and γ is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. The employees are
motivated to install a works council, if W* > 0 and they do not install one, if
W* ≤ 0. According to the literature, the size of the establishment, a
participative work organization, incentive wages, strict hiring and assessment
rules, dummies for exporters, establishments bound by collective bargaining
and establishments with branches, as well as different legal forms should be
                                                     
13 The test statistic is: χ2(27): 116.24, Prob > χ2 < 0.01.
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included in Z (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner, 1997; Frick and Sadowski,
1995; Jirjahn, 2003). The results from the literature in the estimation of
equation (4) are replicated, see table A4 in the appendix: Larger
establishments, publicly listed establishments and establishments with
collective bargaining, branches, strict hiring and assessment rules and capital
or profit sharing are more prone to have a works council. Individual
establishments and establishments with autonomous work groups less
frequently have a works council. From the variables included in equation (4),
strict hiring and assessment rules and profit/capital sharing in 1998 do not have
an impact on productivity in 1997-2000 and therefore can be used as
identifying variables.
From the estimation in table A4 explaining the presence of a works council,
the density function φ(γZ) and the distribution function Φ(γZ) for the existence
of a works council can be calculated for each establishment. In order to
consistently estimate the establishment specific fixed effect υ separately for
establishments with and without works councils taking the endogeneity of
works councils into account, the normal hazard function (also called inverse
Mills´ ratio) for the presence of works councils has to be added for both types
of establishments (Maddala, 1983; Wolf and Zwick, 2002a; Hübler and
Jirjahn, 2003):
( )ˆ(5 ) , for 1,
( )
( )ˆ(5 ) , for 0.
1 ( )
Za P X W
Z
Zb P X W
Z

= + + − + = Φ
 
= + + − + = 
−Φ
ϕ γ
ν γ δ σ ε
γ
ϕ γ
ν γ δ σ ε
γ
The coefficient σ measures the covariance between the error term from
equation (2) and the selection equation (4). In equations (5), the production
functions are calculated for both types of establishments while the
instrumented values for participation P  are used in order to account for the
endogeneity of participation simultaneously.
The separate estimation of the production function for establishments with and
without works councils produces an interesting result: the positive productivity
effect of employee-induced participation can be only realized by
establishments with works councils. This means that works councils obviously
favour the proper implementation of participation and the positive collective
voice effect of work councils is more important than the negative restriction
effect. A comparable result is derived by Hübler and Jirjahn (2002) for team-
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work and autonomous work groups (while the productivity impact of the
reduction of hierarchies is negatively influenced by works councils in their
study). Cooke (1994) also finds on the basis of US data that the productivity
effects of participation are larger in unionized firms than in non-unionized
firms. He argues that unionized firms provide a better environment for tapping
the benefits of employee participation than non-union firms.14
This result is not only derived if the endogeneity of works councils is taken
into account. In an exogeneous switching regression model without the
additional selectivity correction terms, the productivity impact of participation
is comparable for establishments with works councils, but higher for
establishments without works councils (not shown here). All results presented
here are also obtained if the sample is restricted to establishments with at least
20 employees.
                                                     
14 This result may be problematic, because neither the endogeneity of the presence of unions
nor of participative workforms is controlled and the production functions are estimated
jointly for unionized and non-unionized firms although large differences between both
groups of firms are revealed in the descriptive analysis.
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Table 3: Productivity Effects of Participation in 1997 on Average
Productivity 1997-2000
Works council not
present (Endogeneous
switching regression
model, IV estimates)
Works council present
(Endogeneous switching
regression model, IV
estimates)
Coefficients z-values Coefficients z-values
Participation 0.14 0.58 0.29* 1.88
ICT investment 0.04 0.76 0.16*** 2.45
Training 0.10* 1.87 0.15* 1.85
Share qualified employees 0.42*** 4.15 0.37*** 2.86
Exporter 0.20*** 2.73 0.06 0.74
State-of-the-art technical equipment 0.13** 2.53 0.16*** 2.74
Collective bargaining 0.04 0.83 -0.03 -0.28
Individual establishment -0.23*** -3.97 0.07 0.27
Partnership -0.08 -1.10 -0.07* -0.82
Publicly listed establishment -0.02 -0.14 0.10 1.17
Establishment size 20-199 0.26*** 4.60 0.00 0.02
Establishment size 200-499 0.15 0.79 0.40* 1.85
Establishment size 500-999 0.09 0.27 0.61*** 2.68
Establishment size 1000+ 0.34 0.95 1.11*** 4.87
East German establishment -0.25*** -4.92 -0.37*** -5.85
Constant -1.88*** -5.52 -0.33 -0.69
- φ/Φ 0.54*** 5.59
φ/(1-Φ) 0.75*** 7.82
N=1219 N=864
Notes: Significance levels: ***<1%, **<5%, all values are for 1997, except works councils,
the value of which is only available for 1998. Also 16 sector dummy variables added,
standard errors are heterosedasticity robust.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 - 2001, own calculations.
Conclusions
This contribution shows that the presence of management-led participative
work organizations in 1997 increases the average productivity of
establishments in Germany in the period 1997 – 2000 by more than 25%. The
introduction of team-work, autonomous work groups and the reduction of
hierarchies therefore provides establishments with an additional productivity
advantage. In this paper, selectivity is controlled by using external instruments
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for participative work organizations. A comparison between the simple OLS
production function estimation and the treatment effect model shows that
especially establishments with productivity gaps introduce participative work
forms and that instrumental variables reduce measurement errors in the OLS
production function. Time invariant unobserved heterogeneity of the
establishments is controlled by using a two-step procedure proposed by Black
and Lynch (2001). In the first step, the establishment fixed effect is estimated
in a system GMM panel production function containing the variable
production inputs capital and labour. In the second step, the average fixed
effects are explained by a large vector of quasi fixed establishment and
employee characteristics including the participation variable. Finally, in an
endogeneous switching regression model, it is demonstrated that works
councils have a positive impact on the productivity effects of participation. In
fact, only establishments with works councils, i.e. employee-induced
participation, can derive positive productivity effects from management-led
participation.
Problematic is the rough measure of management-led participation in this
paper. It is neither known how many employees are covered by these
measures, nor is it known if some establishments abolished some measures
again after 1997 or introduced other personnel measures after 1997. One basic
assumption of the two-step estimation procedure used is that the explanatory
variables in the second step explaining the establishment fixed effect are quasi-
fixed, indeed. This means, however, that all those establishments characterized
as “participative” (or equipped with modern technical equipment, covered by
collective bargaining etc.) in 1997 keep their participative work organization
and the other establishment and employees characteristics until 2000. One can
argue, however, that for a period of four years, this assumption is acceptable
(Black and Lynch, 2001).
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of variables used
Variables 1997 1998 1999 2000 Comments
Value added 12.90 12.85 12.99 13.07 Turnover minus inputs, in DM, logs
Capital 12.44 12.45 12.38 12.44 Constructed by perpetual inventory
method, in DM, in logs
Number of employees 1.95 1.95 1.97 1.96 Number of employees, in logs
Share qualified
employees
0.66 Share of employees with professional
degree on all employees
Exporter 0.17 Establishment exports, yes=1, no=0
State-of-the-art technical
equipment
0.68 Technical state of equipment is modern
or state of the art, yes=1, no=0
Reduction of hierarchies 0.17 Establishment reduced hierarchies until
1997, yes=1, no=0
Teamwork 0.10 Establishment introduced teamwork until
1997, yes=1, no=0
Autonomous work
groups
0.07 Establishment introduced autonomous
work groups, yes=1, no=0
Incentive wages 0.04 Establishment offers incentive wages,
yes=1, no=0
Strict hiring rules 0.09 Establishment has strict hiring rules,
yes=1, no=0
Assessment system 0.09 Establishment has an assessment system
for employees, yes=1, no=0
Participation 0.27 Establishment introduced participative
work form until 1997, yes=1, no=0
Works council 0.29 Establishment has works council, yes=1,
no=0
Collective bargaining 0.74 Establishment is subject to or orients
itself on sector or establishment specific
collective wages, yes=1, no=0
Individual establishment 0.14 Establishment is an individual firm,
yes=1, no=0
Partnership 0.08 Establishment is a partnership, yes=1,
no=0
Publicly listed
establishment
0.05 Establishment is publicly listed, yes=1,
no=0
Limited (reference) 0.63 Establishment is a public limited
company, yes=1, no=0
Expected skill shortage 0.24 Establishment expects skill shortages in
next 2 years, yes=1, no=0
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Table A1 (continued)
Expected organizational
problems due to maternal
leave
0.11 Establishment expects organizational
problems due to maternal leave in next 2
years, yes=1, no=0
Expected large demand
for training and
qualification
0.15 Establishment expects large demand for
training and qualification in next 2 years,
yes=1, no=0
Expected increase in
internal formal courses
0.27 Establishment expects increase in
internal formal courses in next 2 years,
yes=1, no=0
Expected increase in job
rotation
0.09 Establishment expects increase in job
rotation in next 2 years, yes=1, no=0
Expected increase in
self-induced training
0.12 Establishment expects increase in self-
induced training in next 2 years, yes=1,
no=0
Expected increase in
quality circles
0.12 Establishment expects increase in quality
circles in next 2 years, yes=1, no=0
Note: Averages derived from cross-section samples and weighted.
Source: IAB establishment panel, waves 1997-2001, own calculations.
Table A2: Rotateda component matrix of factor analysis
Factor Variables Factor loadings
Shift responsibilities 0.82
Team-work 0.80
Participative work
organization
Independent work
groups
0.73
Notes: a The factors have been rotated by promax.
Source: IAB establishment panel, wave 1999, own calculations.
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Table A3: System GMM production function 1997-2000, endogeneous
variable: value added
Coefficients z-values
Capital 0.01 1.14
Labour 0.54*** 9.26
Constant 12.88*** 73.77
3 time and 13 industry
dummies
Yes
Number of observations 3465
Number of establishments 973
Wald-test of joint
significance
91.24 p = 0.00
Wald-test of time and
industry dummies
152.01 p = 0.00
Sargan-test 30.47 p = 0.11
Test for first order serial
correlation
-5.96 p = 0.00
Test for second order serial
correlation
0.33 p = 0.75
Note: Significance level: ***<1%. The standard errors are heteroscedasticity corrected.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 - 2001, own calculations.
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Table A4: Probit regression, endogeneous variable: works council
Variables Coefficient z-Value
Establishment size 20-49 0.58*** 6.31
Establishment size 50-99 1.27*** 12.87
Establishment size 100-249 1.99*** 19.10
Establishment size 250-499 2.18*** 16.46
Establishment size 500+ 2.48*** 16.36
Establishment with branches 0.27*** 3.87
Reduction of hierarchies -0.04 -0.58
Teamwork 0.08 0.99
Autonomous work groups -0.26*** -3.22
Incentive wages 0.20** 2.29
Strict hiring rules 0.27*** 4.15
Assessment system 0.16** 2.55
Exporter 0.08 1.06
Collective bargaining 0.85*** 12.53
Individual establishment -0.67*** -5.78
Partnership -0.01 -0.17
Publicly listed establishment 0.48*** 2.88
East German establishment -0.21*** -3.26
Constant -2.10*** -8.09
Number of observations = 3933 Pseudo R2 = 0.51
Notes: Significance levels: ***<1%, **<5%. All variables take the values of year
1997 (except works councils the values of which are only available for 1998), also 13
sector dummy variables are added, standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.
Source: IAB establishment panel, wave 1999, own calculations.
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